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Abstract
This paper proposes to investigate the impact of the channel model for authentication systems based on codes that
are corrupted by a physically unclonable noise such as the one emitted by a printing process. The core of such a
system for the receiver is to perform a statistical test in order to recognize and accept an original code corrupted by
noise and reject any illegal copy or a counterfeit. This study highlights the fact that the probability of type I and type II
errors can be better approximated, by several orders of magnitude, when using the Cramér-Chernoff theorem instead
of a Gaussian approximation. The practical computation of these error probabilities is also possible using Monte Carlo
simulations combined with the importance sampling method. By deriving the optimal test within a Neyman-Pearson
setup, a first theoretical analysis shows that a thresholding of the received code induces a loss of performance. A
second analysis proposes to find the best parameters of the channels involved in the model in order to maximize the
authentication performance. This is possible not only when the opponent’s channel is identical to the legitimate
channel but also when the opponent’s channel is different, leading this time to a min-max game between the two
players. Finally, we evaluate the impact of an uncertainty for the receiver on the opponent channel, and we show that
the authentication is still possible whenever the receiver can observe forged codes and uses them to estimate the
parameters of the model.
1 Introduction
The problem of authentication of physical products such
as documents, goods, drugs, and jewels is a major concern
in a world of global exchanges. The World Health Orga-
nization in 2005 claimed that nearly 25% of medicines
in developing countries are forgeries [1], and accord-
ing to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), international trade in counterfeit
and pirated goods reached more than US$250 billion in
2009 [2].
1.1 Addressed problem and related works
Authentication of physical products is generally done
by using the stochastic structure of either the materi-
als that composes the product or of a printed package
associated to it. Authentication can be performed for
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example by recording the random patterns of the fiber
of a paper [3], but such a system is practically heavy to
deploy since each product needs to be linked to its high-
definition capture stored in a database. Another solution
is to rely on the degradation induced by the interaction
between the product and a physical process such as print-
ing, marking, embossing, carving, etc. Because of both
the defaults of the physical process and the stochastic
nature of the matter, this interaction can be considered
as a physically unclonable function (PUF) [4] that can-
not be reproduced by the forger and can consequently
be used to perform authentication. In [5], the authors
measure the degradation of the inks within printed color
tiles and use discrepancy between the statistics of the
authentic and print-and-scan tiles to perform authentica-
tion. Other marking techniques can also be used; in [6],
the authors propose to characterize the random profiles
of laser marks on materials such as metals (the tech-
nique is called LPUF for laser-written PUF) to use them as
authentication features.
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We study in this paper an authentication system which
uses the fact that a printing process at very high resolution
can be seen as a stochastic process due to the nature of
different elements such as the paper fibers, the ink het-
erogeneity, or the dot addressability of the printer. Such
an authentication system has been proposed by Picard et
al. [7,8] and uses 2D pseudo-random binary codes that are
printed at the native resolution of the printer (2,400 dpi
on a standard offset printer or 812 dpi on a digital HP
Indigo printer).
The principle of the studied system in this paper is
depicted in Figure 1:
• The original code is secretly exchanged between the
legitimate source and the receiver.
• Once printed on a package to be authenticated, the
degraded code will be scanned then thresholded by
an opponent (the forger). It is important to note that
at this stage thresholding is necessary for the
opponent because the industrial printers can only
print dots, e.g., binary versions of the scanned
code.
• The opponent then produces a printed copy of the
original code to manufacture his forgery.
• The receiver performs a test on an observed scanned
code, being either the scanned version of the original
printed code or the scanned version of the fake code.
Using his knowledge on the original code, he
establishes a statistical test in order to perform
authentication.
Figure 1 Principle of authentication using graphical codes.
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One advantage of this system over previously cited ones
is that it is easy to deploy since the authentication process
needs only a scan of the graphical code under scrutiny and
the seed used to generate the original one: no fingerprint
database is required in this case.
The security of this system solely relies on the use of a
PUF, i.e., the impossibility for the opponent to accurately
estimate the original binary code. Different security anal-
ysis have already been performed with respect to (w.r.t.)
this authentication system or to very similar ones. In [9],
the authors have studied the impact of multiple printed
observations of same graphical codes and have shown
that the power of the noise due to the printing process
can be reduced in this particular setup, but not com-
pletely removed due to deterministic printing artifacts.
In [10], the authors use machine learning tools in order
to try to infer the original code from an observation of
the printed code; their study shows that the estimation
accuracy can be increased without recovering perfectly
the original code. In [11], the authors propose a print and
scan model adapted to graphical code and derive attacks
and adapted detection metrics to counter the attacks.
In [12], the authors consider the security analysis in the
rather similar setup of passive fingerprinting using binary
fingerprints under informed attacks (the channel between
the original code and the copied code is assumed to be a
binary symmetric channel). They show that in this case
the security increase with the code length, and they pro-
pose a practical threshold when type I error (originally
detected as a forgery) and type II error (forgery detected
as an original) are equal.
1.2 Notations
We denote sets by calligraphic font, e.g., X , random vari-
ables (RV) ranging over these sets by the same italic
capitals, e.g., X, and their outcomes in lowercase letters,
e.g., x. EX[.] denotes the expectation over X. The cardi-
nality of the set X is denoted by |X |. The sequence of N
variables (X1,X2, ....,XN ) is denoted XN .
1.3 Setup
The binary graphical code can be seen as an authentica-
tion sequence xN chosen at random from the message set
XN and shared secretly with the legitimate receiver. In our
authentication model, xN is published as a noisy version
yN taking values in the set of points VN (see Figure 1). An
opponent may observe yN and, naturally, tries to retrieve
the original authentication sequence. He obtains an esti-
mated sequence xˆN and publish a forgery as a sequence
zN taking value in the same set of points VN , hoping that
it will be accepted by the receiver as coming from the
legitimate source. When observing a sequence oN , which
may be one of the two possible sequences yN or zN , the
destination has to decide whether this observed sequence
comes from the legitimate source or not.
The authentication model involves two channels X →
(Y ,Z), and in the rest of the paper, we define the main
channel as the channel between the legitimate source and
the receiver, and the opponent channel as the channel
between the legitimate source and the receiver but pass-
ing through the counterfeiter channel (see Figure 1). The
two channels X → (Y ,Z) are considered being discrete
and memoryless with conditional probability distribution
PYZ|X(y, z | x). The marginal channels PY |X and PZ|X
constitute the transition probability matrices of the main
channel and the opponent channel, respectively.
As we shall see in the rest of the paper, authentication
performances are directly impacted by the discrimina-
tion between the two channels and can be maximized by
channel optimization.
Note that the authentication sequence xN is generated
using a secure pseudo-random number generator (PRNG)
having a sufficiently large key space to prevent brute-force
attacks. The seed of the PRNG can practically be transmit-
ted using both a secure lossless communication channel
and via a key distribution system so that the receiver can
generate xN from the seed. The security of such a system
is beyond the scope of this paper.
1.4 Contributions of the paper
The goal of this paper is twofold:
• Firstly, it provides reliable performance
measurements of the authentication system based on
a Neyman-Pearson hypothesis test (i.e., to compute
accurately the probability of rejecting an authentic
code and the probability of non-detecting an illegal
copy, denoted as type I and type II errors,
respectively). An asymptotic expression which is
more accurate than the Gaussian expression is first
proposed to compute these probabilities of errors;
then, the importance sampling simulation method is
provided to practically estimate them. We evaluate
the impact of the Gaussian approximation of the test
with respect to its asymptotic expression.
• Secondly, the computation of type I and type II errors
are used to derive the most favorable channels for
authentication. We show first that it is in the
receiver’s interest to process directly the scanned
grayscale code instead of a binary version. Then, the
error probabilities are used to compute for a given
channel model, the configuration which maximizes
the authentication performance.
This paper is an extension of [13] in which we use the
generalized Gaussian distribution family instead of the
Gaussian distribution as in [13]. Moreover, the analytical
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formulation of these probabilities is practically confirmed
by using an importance sampling method, a Monte Carlo
strategy of numerical simulation that can be used to com-
pute rare events. We also present how to design the chan-
nel in order to maximize the authentication performance
for different cases of generalized Gaussian distributions
and when the opponent is either passive (he undergoes the
same channel as the receiver) or active (he can adapt his
channel).
2 The authentication channel
2.1 Channel modeling
Let TV |X be the generic transition matrix modeling the
whole physical processes used, more specifically the print-
ing and scanning devices. The entries of this matrix are
conditional probabilities TV |X(v | x) relating an input
alphabet X and the output alphabet V . In practical and
realistic situations, X is a binary alphabet standing for
black (0) and white (1) elements of a digital code, and the
channel output set V stands for the set of gray-level val-
ues with cardinality K (for printed and scanned images,
K = 256). Transition matrix TV |X may conceptually be
any discrete distribution over the set V , but we will focus
in Section 4.4 on some common and realistic distributions
when analyzing numerically the performance.
The marginal distribution of the main channel PY |X
is equivalent to one print and scan process, and con-
sequently, we have PY |X = TV |X . On the other hand,
PZ|X depends on the opponent processing while he has to
retrieve the original sequence before reprinting it. We aim
here at expressing this marginal distribution considering
that the opponent tries to restore the original sequence
before publishing his fraudulent sequence zN .
When performing a detection to obtain an estimated
sequence xˆN of the original code, the opponent undergoes
errors. These errors are evaluated with probabilities Pe,W
when confusing an original white dot with a black and
Pe,B when confusing an original black dot with a white.
This distinction is due to the fact that the distribution
TV |X of the physical devices is arbitrary and not neces-
sarily symmetric. Let DW be the optimal decision region
















PY |X(v | X = 1). (3)
where DcW is the complementary region in the set V . The
channel X → Xˆ can be modeled as a binary input binary
output (BIBO) channel with transition probability matrix
PXˆ|X :
[
PXˆ|X(xˆ = 0 | x = 0) PXˆ|X(xˆ = 1 | x = 0)




1 − Pe,B Pe,B
Pe,W 1 − Pe,W
]
(4)
As we can see in Figure 1, the opponent channelX → Z
is a physically degraded version of themain channel. Thus,
X → Xˆ → Z forms a Markov chain with the rela-
tion PXˆZ|X(xˆ, z | x) = PXˆ|X(xˆ | x)TZ/Xˆ(z | xˆ), where
TZ|Xˆ is the transition matrix of the counterfeiter physical
device. Components of the marginal channel matrix PZ|X
are
PZ|X(v | x) =
∑
xˆ=0,1




PXˆ|X(xˆ | x)TZ|Xˆ(v | xˆ).
(5)
Finally, we have
PZ|X(v | X = 0) = (1 − Pe,B)TZ|Xˆ(v | Xˆ = 0)
+ Pe,BTZ|Xˆ(v | Xˆ = 1), (6)
PZ|X(v | X = 1) = (1 − Pe,W )TZ|Xˆ(v | Xˆ = 1)
+ Pe,WTZ|Xˆ(v | Xˆ = 0). (7)
2.2 Receiver’s strategies: thresholding or not?
Two strategies are possible for the receiver.
2.2.1 Binary thresholding
As a first strategy, the legitimate receiver first decode the
observed sequence oN using a maximum likelihood cri-
terion based on the main channel marginal distribution
PY |X . He then restores a binary version x˜N of the original
message xN using the same decision region as defined by
(1) and naturally undergoes errors.
• In the main channel, i.e., when ON = YN , error
probabilities are equivalent to (2) and (3).
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• In the opponent channel, i.e., when ON = ZN , we





PZ|X(v | X = 1), (8)
P˜e,W = (1 − Pe,W )
∑
v∈DcW




TZ|Xˆ(v | Xˆ = 0).








(v | Xˆ = 0). The same development yields
P˜e,B = (1 − Pe,B)P′e,B + Pe,B(1 − P′e,W ). (10)
For this first strategy, the opponent channel may be
viewed as the cascade of two binary input/binary output
channels:
[
1 − P˜e,B P˜e,B




1 − Pe,B Pe,B




1 − P′e,B P′e,B
P′e,W 1 − P′e,W
]
. (11)
As we will see in the next section, in this particular case,
the test to decide whether the observed decoded sequence
x˜N comes from the legitimate source or not is tantamount
to counting the number of erroneous decoded dots.
2.2.2 Gray-level observations
In the second strategy, the receiver performs his test
directly on the received sequence oN without any given
decoding. We will see in Section 3.3 that this strategy is
better than the previous one (see Section 3.2).
3 Impacts of the receiver’s strategies on
hypothesis testing
We consider here testing whether, for a given fixed input
(x1, . . . , xN ), an observed independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) sequence (o1, . . . , oN | x1, . . . , xN ) is
generated from a given distribution PY |X or if it comes
from an alternative hypothesis associated to distribu-
tion PZ|X , (oi | xi) belonging to a discrete finite set V .
Practically, we are interested in performing authentica-
tion after observing a sequence of N samples (oi | xi),
attesting whereas this sequence comes from a legitimate
source or from a counterfeiter. The receiver establishes
then a decision based on a predefined statistical test and
assigns one of the two hypothesis H0 or H1 correspond-
ing, respectively, to each of the former cases. Accord-
ing to this test, the space VN will be partitioned into
two regions H0 and H1. Accepting hypothesis H0 while
it is actually a fake (the observed N sample sequence
belongs to H0 while H1 is true) leads to an error of type
II having probability β . Rejecting hypothesis H0 while
actually the observed sequence comes from the legiti-
mate source (the observed N sample sequence belongs
to H1 while H0 is true) leads to an error of type I with
probability α. It is desirable to find a test with a min-
imal probability β for a fixed or prescribed probability
of type I. An optimal decision rule will be given by
the Neyman-Pearson criterion. The eponymous theorem
states that under the constraint α ≤ α∗, β is minimized
if only if the following log-likelihood test infers the choice
of H1:
log P
N (oN | xN , H1)
PN (oN | xN , H0) ≥ γ , (12)
where γ is a threshold verifying the constraint α ≤ α∗.
3.1 Authentication via binary thresholding
In the first strategy, the final observed data is x˜N and the
original sequence xN is a side information containing two
types of data (‘0’ and ‘1’). The conditional distribution of
each random component (X˜i | xi) of the sequence (X˜N |
xN ) is the same for each given type. We compute now the
probabilities that describe the two random i.i.d. sequences
(X˜N | xN ), one per data type, and for each of the two pos-
sible hypothesis. We derive then the corresponding test
from (12). Under hypothesisHj, j ∈ {0, 1}, these probabili-
ties are expressed conditionally to the known original code
xN . Let NB = {i : xi = 0} and NW = {i : xi = 1}, with
NB = |NB| and NW = |NW |. Because of i.i.d. sequences,
we have
PN (x˜N | xN , Hj) =
N∏
i=1
P(x˜i | xi, Hj),
PN (x˜N | xN , Hj) =
∏
i∈NB




P(x˜i | 1, Hj).
Under hypothesis H0 the channel X → X˜ has distribu-
tions given by (2) and (3) and we have:
PN
(
x˜N | xN , H0
) = (Pe,B)ne,B(1 − Pe,B)NB−ne,B
× (Pe,W )ne,W (1 − Pe,W )NW−ne,W ,
where ne,B and ne,W are the number of errors (x˜i = xi)
when black is decoded into white and when white is
decoded into black, respectively.
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• Under hypothesis H1, the channel X → X˜ has
distributions given by (9) and (10), and we have
PN
(
x˜N | xN , H1
) = (P˜e,B)ne,B(1 − P˜e,B)NB−ne,B
× (P˜e,W )ne,W (1 − P˜e,W )NW−ne,W .
Applying now the Neyman Pearson criterion (12), the
test is expressed as
L1 = log P
N (x˜N | xN , H1)
PN
(











P˜e,W (1 − Pe,W )

















expression has the practical advantage to only count the
number of errors in order to perform the authentication
task but at a cost of a loss of optimality.
3.2 Authentication via gray-level observations
In the second strategy, the observed data is oN . Here again,
the conditional distribution of each random component
(Oi | xi) of the sequence (ON | xN ) is the same for each
type of data of X. The Neyman Pearson test is expressed
as
L2 = log P
N (oN | xN ,H1)

























TY |X(oi | 0) + Pe,W
TZ|Xˆ(oi | 1)









TY |X(oi | 1)+Pe,B
TZ|Xˆ(oi | 0)






Note that the expressions of the transition matrix mod-
eling the physical processes TY |X and TZ|Xˆ are required in
order to perform the optimal test.
3.3 Authentication with thresholding vs authentication
without thresholding
In this setup and without loss of generality, we consider
only the Gaussian model with variance σ 2 for the physi-
cal devices TY |X and TZ|Xˆ . Figure 2 compares the receiver
operating characteristic (ROC) curves associated with the
two different strategies. Note that the error probabilities
are computed using the results given in the next section
(see Section 4.2). We can notice that the gap between
the two strategies is important. This is not surprising
since the binary thresholding removes information from
the gray-level observation, yet this has a practical impact
because one practitioner can be tempted to count the
number of errors as given in (14) as an authentication
score for its easy implementation. The information theo-
retical analysis presented in the Appendix confirms also
that authentication is more accurate without threshold-
ing, and this result is in line with the remark of Blahut in
[14] where in p108 he writes that ‘information is increased
if a measurement is made more precise [...] (i.e. with a
refinement of the set of measurement outcomes).’
Moreover, as we will see in Section 5, the plain scan
of the graphical code can be used whenever the receiver
needs to estimate the opponent’s channel.
4 Toward reliable performance evaluation
In the previous section we have expressed the Neyman-
Pearson test for the two proposed strategies resumed by
(14) and (17). These tests may then be practically per-
formed on the observed sequence in order to make a
decision about its authenticity. We aim now at expressing
the error probabilities of types I and II and comparing the
two possible strategies described previously. Letm = 1, 2
Figure 2 ROC curves for the two different strategies (N = 2, 000,
σ = 52). α is the probability of rejecting an authentic code and β the
probability of non-detecting an illegal copy.
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PLm(l | H1). (19)
where PLm(l | Hj) is the distribution of the log-likelihood
ratio Lm under hypothesis Hj.
4.1 Gaussian approximation
As the length N of the sequence is generally large, we use
the central limit theorem to study the distributions PLm ,
m = 1, 2 (a similar strategy was proposed in [15]).
• For the binary thresholding strategy, ne,W and ne,B in
(14) are binomial random variables depending on the
origin of the observed sequence. Let Nx stand for the
number of data of type x in the original code and Pe,x
the cross-over probabilities emerging from type x in
the BIBO channels (4) or (11). When N is large
enough, the binomial random variables can be
approximated with a Gaussian distribution. We have
ne,x ∼ N (NxPe,x, NxPe,x(1 − Pe,x)). (20)
From (14), L1 is a weighted sum of Gaussian random
variables and one can obviously deduce the
parameters of the normal approximation describing
the log-likelihood L1.
• For the second strategy, i.e., when the receiver tests
directly the observed gray-level sequence, the
log-likelihood L2 in Equation 17 may be expressed as












where (v, x) is a function  : X × V →R having
some distribution with mean and variance equal to
mx = E[ (V , x) | Hj]=
∑
v∈V
(v, x)P(v | x, Hj),
(22)
and
var[ (V , x) | Hj]=
∑
v∈V
((v, x)−mx)2P(v | x ,Hj),
(23)
with P = PY |X (respectively P = PZ|X ) for j = 0
(respectively 1). The central limit theorem is then
used again to approximate the distribution of L2 and
compute type I and type II error probabilities.
4.2 Asymptotic expression
In this section, we drop the subscribe m denoting the
strategy as all the subsequent analysis is common for both
of them. One important problem is the fact that the Gaus-
sian approximation proposed previously provides inaccu-
rate error probability values when the threshold λ in (18)
and (19) is far from themean of the log-likelihood random
variable L. Chernoff bound and large deviation theory [16]
are preferred in this context as very small error probabil-
ities of types I and II may be desired [17]. Given a real
number s, the Chernoff bound on type I and type II errors
may be expressed as
α = Pr(L ≥ λ | H0) ≤ e−sλgL(s ; H0) for any s > 0,
(24)
β = Pr(L ≤ λ | H1) ≤ e−sλgL(s ; H1) for any s < 0,
(25)
where the function gL(s ; Hj) , j = 0, 1 is the moment
generating function of the random variable L defined as





where expectation is performed with respect to distribu-
tion PL(L | Hj). Reminding that L is a sum of N indepen-
dent random variables, asymptotic analysis in probability
theory (when N is large enough) shows that bounds simi-
lar to (24) and (25) aremuchmore appropriate for estimat-
ing α and β than the Gaussian approximation especially
when λ is far from E [L], namely when bounding the tails
of a distribution [16,17]. The tightest bound is obtained
by finding the value of s that provides the minimum of the
right-hand side (RHS) of (24) and (25), i.e., the minimum
of e−sλgL(s ; Hj) for each j = 0, 1. Taking the derivative,
the value s that provides the tightest bound under each











We introduce the semi-invariant moment generating
function after an acute observation of the identity (27).
The semi-invariant moment generating function of L is
μL(s ; Hj) = ln gL(s ; Hj). (28)
This function has many interesting properties that ease
the extraction of an asymptotic expression for (24) and
(25) [17]. For instance, this function is additive for the sum
of independent random variables, and we have
μL(s ; Hj) =
∑
i∈NB
μi, 0(s ; Hj) +
∑
i∈NW
μi, 1(s ; Hj), (29)
where μi, x(s ; Hj) is the semi-invariant moment generat-
ing function of the random component (Oi, x) when the
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observed sequence comes from the distribution associ-
ated to hypothesis Hj. In addition, relation (27) may be





μ′i, 0(s˜j ; Hj) +
∑
i∈NW
μ′i, 1(s˜j ; Hj). (30)
Chernoff bounds on type I and type II errors (24) and
(25) may then be expressed as













μi, 1(s˜0 ; H0) − s˜0μ′i, 1(s˜0 ; H0)
)⎤⎦ ,
and













μi, 1(s˜1 ; H1) − s˜1μ′i, 1(s˜1 ; H1)
)⎤⎦ .
The distribution of each random component (Oi | xi) in
the sequence (ON | xN ) is the same for each type of dataX,
and consequently, μi, x(s ; Hj) = μx(s ; Hj), i.e., μi, x(s ; Hj)
is independent from i for each type of data x. The RHS in





μ0(s˜j ; Hj) − s˜jμ′0(s˜j ; Hj)
)+ NW (μ1(s˜j ; Hj)




Roughly speaking, Cramér’s theorem [16] states that for
sufficiently large N , the upper bounds expressed for j =
0, 1 in (33) are also lower bounds for α and β , respectively.














μ(s˜1; H1) − s˜1μ′(s˜1 ; H1)
]
, (35)
where s˜0 > 0, s˜1 < 0, μ(s˜j; Hj) = μ0(s˜j; Hj) + μ1(s˜j; Hj),
μ′(s˜j; Hj) = μ′0(s˜j; Hj) + μ′1(s˜j; Hj). A modified asymp-
totic expression including a correction factor is evalu-
ated for the sum of an i.i.d random sequence (see [17],
Appendix 5A), and for large N , we have































where μ′′(s˜j; Hj) = μ′′0(s˜j; Hj) + μ′′1(s˜j; Hj) is the sec-
ond derivative of the semi-invariant moment generating
function of (V , x) defined by
(v, 1) = log
(
(1 − Pe,W )
TZ|Xˆ(v | 1)
TY |X(v | 1) + Pe,W
TZ|Xˆ(v | 0)








TY |X(v | 0) + Pe,B
TZ|Xˆ(v | 1)




4.3 Numerical computations of α and β via importance
sampling
This section addresses the problem of estimating numer-
ically type I and type II error probabilities, i.e., α and β .
Monte Carlo simulation method [18] gives accurate solu-
tion since these probabilities can be expressed as expec-
tations of a function of a random variable governed by a








PN (vN | xN , H0)φ(vN ; H1), (41)
where φ(vN ; H1) = 1 whenever vN ∈ H1 and zero if
not. The probability of type I error is then expressed as
the expectation of φ(vN ; H1) under distribution PN (vN |
xN , H0). In the same way, type II error probability β is
the expectation of φ(vN ; H0) under distribution PN (vN |
xN , H1). In the sequel, we denote PN (vN | xN , H0) = PNY |X
and PN (vN | xN , H1) = PNZ|X , and we have










Monte Carlo methods make use of the law of large
numbers to infer an estimation for α and β by comput-
ing numerically an empirical mean for φ(vN ; H1) and
φ(vN ; H0), respectively. Clearly, the computer runsNtrials,
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each one generating an i.i.d. vector vN , where samples vn
are driven from distributions PY |X and PZ|X , respectively,










(vn)(i)being generated from PZ|X .
The Monte Carlo estimator is unbiased (αˆ → α and
βˆ → β) almost surely, and the rate of convergence is
N−1/2trials. Recalling that for a zero mean and unit variance
Gaussian random variable U , P(|U| ≤ 1.96) = 0.95, the
confidence interval at 0.95 obtained from each estimation
is
[ αˆ − 1.96σα√
Ntrials
, αˆ + 1.96σα√
Ntrials
] (44)
[ βˆ − 1.96σβ√
Ntrials
, βˆ + 1.96σβ√
Ntrials
] , (45)
where σα (resp. σβ) is the standard deviation of the ran-
dom variable φ((VN )(i); H1) (resp. φ((VN )(i); H0)). As
φ((vN )(i); H1) and φ((vN )(i); H0) are Bernoulli random
variables with parameter α and β , respectively, their vari-
ances are easily deduced, e.g., σ 2α = α − α2 ≈ α and
σ 2β = β − β2 ≈ β . When α and β are very small, accu-
rate estimations are then difficult to achieve with realistic
number of trials. Roughly speaking, the number of trials
needed is Ntrials > 10
3
α
(or Ntrials > 10
3
β
) when the desired
confidence interval at 0.95 is constrained to be about a
tenth of the expected value of α or β . Actually, we need to
evaluate numerically very small values of α and β to draw
the curve β(α) evaluating the performance of a given test
statistic. The required number of trials fails to be realistic.
We propose then to use the importance sampling method
[18] which enables us to generate rare events and thus
reduce considerably the required number of trials. Let us
consider distributions QY |X and QZ|X over the set V such





















One can then alternatively express type I and type II
error probabilities by














Monte Carlo simulation with importance sampling










PNY |X((vN )(i) | xN )
QNY |X((vN )(i) | xN )
]
,










PNZ|X((vN )(i) | xN )
QNZ|X((vN )(i) | xN )
]
,
(vN )(i) being generated fromQNZ|X . (49)
The problem of importance sampling is to choose an
adequate function QV |X such that the variance of the esti-
mated probabilities in (48) and (49) are very small. The
number of trials will be considerably reduced and accurate
estimations of very low values of α and β may be possible.
Let
QY |X(s, v | x) = exp (−μx(s; H0) + s(v, x))PY |X(v | x)
and
QZ|X(s, v | x) = exp (−μx(s ; H1) + s(v, x))PZ|X(v | x)
be tilted distributions over the set V , and μx(s; Hj) the
semi-invariant moment generating function of (v, x) dis-
tributed under hypothesis Hj.
Proposition 1. The mean of the log-likelihood function
(v, x) governed by the tilted distributions QY |X(s, v | x) is
μ′x(s; H0).











(v, x)exp (s(v, x))PY |X(v |x)
exp (μx(s;H0))
;
Phan Ho et al. EURASIP Journal on Information Security 2014, 2014:9 Page 10 of 17
http://jis.eurasipjournals.com/content/2014/1/9




, the denominator of the
previous expression is simply gx(s; H0):
∑
v∈V
(v, x)QY |X(s, v |x) =
∑
v∈V
(v,x) exp (s(v,x))PY |X(v |x)∑
v∈V









(v, x)QY |X(s, v | x) = μ′x(s; H0). (50)
The same development yields
∑
v∈V
(v, x)QZ|X(s, v | x) = μ′x(s; H1). (51)
When choosing s = s˜0 for QY |X(s, v | x) and s = s˜1
for QZ|X(s, v | x), the mean of the log-likelihood function
(v, x) governed by these tilted distributions will be equal
to the threshold λ of the test 30.
Proposition 2. The variances of the estimations in (48)
and (49) go to zero as the number of dots is sufficiently
large.
Proof. To show this, let oN be the observed samples
coming from the main channel, e.g., driven from the tilted
distribution QNY |X(s˜0, vN | xN ). We have

















× PNY |X(oN | xN ).
Recalling that μ(s˜j; Hj) = μ0(s˜j; Hj) + μ1(s˜j; Hj), for
NB ≈ NW ≈ N/2, we have
QNY |X(s˜0, oN | xN ) = exp
⎛












⎠PNY |X(oN | xN ).
By the law of large numbers, the sum of N/2 log-
likelihood functions of the observed samples (oi | x) gov-
erned by the tilted distribution, converges in probability
















(v, 1)QY |X(s˜0, v |1)= N2 μ
′
1(s˜0; H0).
Recalling that μ′(s˜j; Hj) = μ′0(s˜j; Hj) + μ′1(s˜j; Hj), and








⎠ P→ N2 μ′(s˜0; H0).
Equivalently, when observed samples come from the
opponent channel, e.g., drawn from the tilted distribution








⎠ P→ N2 μ′(s˜1; H1).
Finally, we have






× PNY |X(oN | xN ) (52)
and




μ(s˜1; H1)− s˜1μ′(s˜1; H1)
))
× PNZ|X(oN | xN ). (53)




when VN is governed
by the tilted distribution QNY |X(s˜0, vN | xN ) is then (the































The denominator in the expectation, i.e., exp
(−N2(
μ(s˜0; H0) − s˜0μ′(s˜0; H0)
))
, is simply the inverse of the
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Finally, since EPNY |X
[
φ(VN ; H1)
] = α (42), the variance
















4.4 Practical performance analysis
Without loss of generality, we use in our analysis a gener-
alized Gaussian distribution to model the physical device,
i.e., the association of a printer with a scanner, used by
the legitimate source TY |X(v | x) and by the counterfeiter
TZ|Xˆ(v | xˆ):
p(v | x) = b2a
(1/b)e
−(|v−m(x)|/a)b , (54)
where m(x) is the mean and the parameter a can be




The parameter b is used to control the sparsity of the
distribution, for example, when b = 1 the distribution is
Laplacian, b = 2 the distribution is Gaussian, and b →
+∞ the distribution is uniform. The resulting distribution
is first discretized then truncated to provide values within
[ 0, . . . , 255] to model a scanning process. Each channel
is parametrized in this case by four parameters, two per
each type of dots, mb = m(0) and σb for black dots
and mw = m(1) and σw for white dots. Note that other
print and scan models that take into account the gamma
transfer function or additive noise with input dependent
variance can be found in [19], but the general methodol-
ogy of this paper is not dependent on the model and can
still be applied.
Figure 3 illustrates the different effects of the general-
ized Gaussian distributions on the main and the opponent
channels of same mean and variance and b = 1 (Laplacian
distribution), b = 2 (Gaussian distribution), and b = 6,
i.e., close to a uniform distribution.
In order to assess the accuracy of the computations of
α and β using either the Gaussian approximation given by
(18) and (19), the asymptotic expression given by (36) and
(37), or the Monte Carlo simulations using importance
sampling given by (48) and (49), we derive ROC curves for
generalized Gaussian distributions and b = {1, 2, 6}.
Figure 4 illustrates the gap between the estimation of α
and β using the Gaussian approximation and the asymp-
totic expression or the Monte Carlo simulations. The
Monte Carlo simulations confirm the fact that the derived
Cramér Chernoff bounds are tight, and the difference
between the results obtained with the Gaussian approxi-
mation are very important especially for close to uniform
channels. We can also notice that for the same channel
power, the authentication performances are better for b =
6 then for b = 2 and b = 1.
5 Optimal configurations for authentication
The goal of this section is to derive configurations that are
optimal regarding authentication, i.e., to derive configura-
tions that for a given α minimize β .
5.1 Optimal configurations by modification of the
printing channel
5.1.1 Problem setting
This authentication problem can be seen as a game where
the main goal of the receiver, for a given false alarm proba-
bility α, is to find a channel that minimizes the probability
of missed detection β . Practically, this means that the
channel can be chosen by using a given quality of paper,
a different ink, and/or by adopting an appropriate res-
olution. For example, if the legitimate source wants to
decrease the noise variance, he can choose to use over-
sampling to replicate the dots; on the contrary, if the
legitimate source wants to increase the noise variance, he
can use a paper of lesser quality. It is important to recall
that because the opponent will have to print a binary ver-
sion of its observation, and because a printing device at
this very high resolution can only print binary images,
the opponent will in any case have to print with decoding
errors after estimation Xˆ.
We analyze two scenarios described below:
• The legitimate source and the opponent have
identical printing devices; practically, this means that
they use exactly the same printing setup. In this case,
the legitimate source will try to look for the channel C
such that for a given α, the legitimate party will have




In this case, the opponent is passive and has no strategy
but duplicating the graphical code.
• The opponent can modify its printing channel Co
(here, we assume that he can change the variance of
its noise), practically it means that he can modify one
or several parameters of the printing setup without
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Figure 3 Example of a 20× 20 code which is printed and scanned by an opponent.Main and opponent channels are identical,mb = 50,
mw = 150, σb = 40, and σw = 40.
being detected. The opponent then tries to maximize
the probability of false detection by choosing the
adequate printing channel, and the legitimate sources
will adopt the printing channel Cl which will
minimize the probability of false detection. We end
up with what is called a min-max game in game






In this case, the opponent is active since he tries to
adapt his strategy in order to degrade the
authentication performance.
Because the expressions of β(α) is not simple and have
to be computed using the asymptotic expressions (31) and
(32), we cannot solve this problem analytically and we
have to use numerical calculus instead.
We conduct this analysis for the generalized Gaussian
model, where we assume that the parameters mb and
mw are constant for the main and the opponent channels
(which implies that the scanning process has the same
calibration for the two types of images). We assume that
the main channel and the opponent channel variances are
respectively denoted σ 2m and σ 2o and are identical for black
and white dots.
5.1.2 Passive opponent
Here, the opponent has to undergo a channel identical
to the main channel; the only parameter of the optimiza-
tion problem (56) is consequently σm. Figure 5 presents
the evolution of β w.r.t. σm for α = 10−6 and mb = 50,
mw = 150. For each channel configuration, we can find an
optimal configuration; this configuration offers a smaller
probability of error for b = 6 than for b = 2 or b = 1.
It is not surprising to notice that in each case, β is impor-
tant whenever σm is very small (i.e., when the print and
scan noise is very small, hence the estimation of the origi-
nal code is easy) or very large (i.e., when the print and scan
noise is so important that the original and forgery become
equally noisy).
5.1.3 Active opponent
In this setup, the opponent can use a channel of differ-
ent variance σ 2o than the main channel σ 2m and tries to
solve the game defined in (57). Figure 6 shows the evo-
lutions of β w.r.t. σo for different σm. We can see that in
each case it is in the opponent interest to optimize his
channel. Note that even if we assume that the opponent
print and scan channel is perfect (xˆN = zN ), because
the input of the printer has to be binary and because the
opponent will make decoding errors by estimating the
original code, the copied printed code will be necessar-
ily different from the original printed code (see Figure 1),
which implies a perfect discrimination between the two
hypotheses.
Figure 7 shows the evolution of best opponent strategy
max
σo
β w.r.t. σm. By comparing it with Figure 5, we can see
that the opponent’s probability of non-detection can be
multiplied by one or several orders of magnitude (×107
for b = 1, ×105 for b = 2, and ×10 for b = 6).
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Figure 4 Comparison between the Gaussian approximation, the
asymptotic expression, and Monte Carlo simulations for b = 1,
b = 2, and b = 6.Main and opponent channels are identical,
mb = 50,mw = 150, σb = 40, and σw = 40.
6 Impact of the estimation of the print and scan
channel
The previous scenarios assume that the receiver has a full
knowledge of the print and scan channel. Here, we assume
that the receiver also has to estimate the opponent chan-
nel before performing authentication. From the estimated
parameters, the receiver will compute a threshold and a
Figure 5 Evolution of β w.r.t. σm ( α = 10−6).Main and opponent
channels are identical,mb = 50 andmw = 150.
log-likelihood test. Depending on the number of observa-
tions No, the estimated model and test will decrease the
performance of the authentication system.
We consider that the opponent uses a different print-
ing device unknown from the legitimate party. According
to (6) and (7), the parameters to be estimated are Pe,W ,
Pe,B, mb, mw, and σ = σb = σw. We use the classical
expectationmaximization (EM) algorithm combined with
Newton’s method to solve the maximization step as these
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Figure 6 Evolution of the probability of non-detection β w.r.t. σ o
for different σm. The plots arriving from left to right show σm
varying from 20 to 80 with an increment of 10.mb = 50,mw = 150,
and α = 10−6.
distributions are discrete and have the finite support of the
gray-level range.
Figure 8 shows the authentication performances using
an estimated Gaussian model (b = 2) from No = 2, 000
observed symbols. We can notice that the performance
is very close to an exact knowledge of the model. This
analysis shows also that if the receiver has some assump-
tions of the opponent channel and enough observations,
Figure 7 Evolution of best opponent strategy max
σ o
β w.r.t. σm.
mb = 50,mw = 150, and α = 10−6.
he should perform model estimation instead of using the
thresholding strategy. Figure 9 shows the importance of
model estimation when comparing it to a blind authen-
tication test when the receiver assumes that both the
opponent channel and his channel are identical.
7 Conclusions
This paper brings numerous conclusions on the authenti-
cation using binary codes corrupted by a manufacturing
stochastic noise:
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Figure 8 Authentication performance using model estimation
with the EM algorithm (N = 2, 000,No = 2, 000, σ = 52,
mb = 50, andmw = 150). The asymptotic expression is used to
derive the error probabilities.
• The nature of the receiver’s input is of upmost
importance, and thresholding is a bad strategy with
respect to getting an accurate version of the genuine
or forged code, except if the system requires it, due
for example to computational requirements.
• The Gaussian approximation used to compute the
ROC of the authentication system are not valuable
anymore for very low type I or type II errors. Cramér
Chernoff bound or Monte Carlo simulations using
importance sampling can be used instead to achieve
accurate values of these probabilities. The proposed
methodology is not impacted by the nature of the
noise and can be applied for different memoryless
channels that are more realistic for modeling the
printing process.
Figure 9 Importance of model estimation when compared to a
blind authentication test. ROC curves comparing different degrees
of knowledge about the opponent channel while the true opponent
printing process model has parameters (σ = 40,mb = 40, and
μw = 160). ‘True model’: the receiver knows exactly this model, ‘Blind
model’: the receiver uses arbitrarily his printing process to model it,
and ‘Est. model’: the receiver estimates the opponent channel using
No = 2, 000 observations.
• It is in the opponent’s interest to adapt its channel in
order to decrease the authentication performances of
the system; this can be possible by solving a max-min
game.
• If the opponent’s print and scan channel remains
unknown for the receiver, he can use estimation
techniques such as the EM algorithm in order to
estimate the channel.
Our future works will consist in evaluating the impact
of the noise model on the authentication performance;
this first analysis suggests that sparse distributions are less
favorable for authentication than dense distributions, but
this has to be confirmed by a deeper study.
Endnote
aOne can show that e−sλgL(s ; Hj) is a convex function
of s.
Appendix
Information theoretic comparison between hypothesis
testing with and without thresholding
In this appendix, we aim at establishing an inequality
between the average of the two log-likelihood tests (14)
and (15). The greater is the discrimination between the
two distributions involved in the log-likelihood test, the
best is the authentication performance. The expected
value of the log-likelihood test (12) with respect to any of
the two distributions involved in the ratio is the Kullback-
Leibler divergence or discrimination defined as
L(PNY |X ;PNZ|X) =
∑
vN∈VN
PNY |X(vN | xN ) log
PNY |X(vN | xN )
PNZ|X(vN | xN )
,
(58)
the base of the logarithm being arbitrary. In the remainder
of this paper, we settle on base 2.
In ([14], p. 114), the author provides an interesting
inequality relating the discrimination to type I and type II
errors in hypothesis testing. This relation is stated by the
following lemma:
Lemma 1. (see the former reference for the proof ) For
any partition (H0, H1) of the observation space VN , the
probabilities of type I and II errors satisfy
L(PNY |X ;PNZ|X) ≥ α log
α




In our authentication model, the likelihood test is per-
formed conditionally to an available side information
involving two types of data x. One type for black points
and the second one for white points in the original code.
In accordance to this, we express now the discrimina-
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tion quantity for the two proposed strategies in order to
establish the desired inequality:





























PNY |X(vN | xN ) log
PNY |X(vN | xN )
PNZ|X(vN | xN )
.
(61)
For the sake of simplicity, we develop proofs and details
for the second strategy only and give results for the thresh-
olding case for which all developments are likewise the
former. Regarding the additivity theorem ([14], theorem
4.3.7) for independent sequences and reminding that the
distribution of each component of the sequence (ON | xN )
is the same for each type of data x, the discrimination
quantity becomes








PY |X(v | 0) log PY |X(v | 0)PZ|X(v | 0) .
(62)
Given a composition (or relative frequency) for X PX =
{NW/N , NB/N}, we have
L(PN (ON | XN ,H0) ; PN (ON | XN ,H1))
= N × L(PY |X ; PZ|X | PX),
(63)
where L(PY/X ; PZ/X | PX) is the average discrimination.
Similarly, we obtain for the first strategy the relation
L(PN (X˜N|XN ,H0);PN (X˜N |XN ,H1))=N×L(Pe,x; P˜e,x |PX).
(64)
Corollary 1. Given an i.i.d outcome XN = xN with com-
position, or type PX, for any partition of the observation
space (H0, H1), the probabilities of type I and II errors
satisfy
L(PY |X ;PZ|X |PX)≥ 1N
(






Proof. The proof is straightforward by combining (59)
and (63).
Corollary 2. Consider a partition of the observation space
(H0, H1) with probability of type I error α; then, the
probability of type II error is lower bounded by
β ≥ 2−[NL(PY |X ;PZ|X |PX)+h(α)]/(1−α). (66)
Proof. From the previous corollary, we have
−(1 − α) logβ ≤ NL(PY |X ; PZ|X | PX) − α logα
− (1 − α) log(1 − α) + α log(1 − β).
Setting h(α) = −α logα − (1− α) log(1− α), which is the
binary entropy (≤ 1), and observing that α log(1−β) ≤ 0,
we can write the inequality
−(1 − α) logβ ≤ NL(PY |X ; PZ|X | PX) + h(α). (67)
It is desired that this lower bound is very small which
is obviously possible with large values of the quantity
L(PY |X ; PZ|X | PX).
Theorem 1. For the two strategies of the receiver, we have
L(PY |X ; PZ|X | PX) ≥ L(Pe,x; P˜e,x | PX)
Figure 10 Comparison between the Kullback-Leibler
divergences. Kullback-Leibler divergence function for the two
different strategies w.r.t. the standard deviation of the Gaussian
model of the physical devices.
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Proof.



























PY |X(v | k) log
∑
v∈DW
PY |X(v | x)∑
v∈DW







PY |X(v | x) log
∑
v∈DcW
PY |X(v | x)
∑
v∈DcW
















PX(x)L(Pe,x, P˜e,x | x),
= L(Pe,x, P˜e,x | PX).

















(b) since Pe,x = ∑
v∈DW





PY |X(v | x), 1−P˜e,x = ∑
v∈DcW
PZ|X(v | x).
Figure 10 plots a comparison between the Kullback-
Leibler divergences with and without thresholding w.r.t.
the variance of Gaussian model of the physical devices, we
can see that the divergence is smaller with thresholding
than without.
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